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P is not equal to NP .
Sten-A˚ke Ta¨rnlund∗†‡
October 29, 2018
Abstract
SAT 6∈ P is true, and provable in the simply consistent extension B′
of the first order theory B of computing, with the single finite axiom B
characterizing a universal Turing machine. Therefore P 6= NP is true,
and provable in the simply consistent extension B′′ of theory B.
1 Introduction
SAT 6∈ P is true, theorem 1, and provable, corollary 9, in the simply consistent
extension B′ of the first order theory B of computing, with a single finite
axiom B characterizing a universal Turing machine.1
Therefore, P 6= NP is true, theorem 2, and provable, corollary 10, in the
simply consistent extension B′′ of theory B, by the Cook-Levin theorem.2 3
SAT is the set of satisfiable propositional formulas. P is the set of classes
of problems with solutions in polynomial computing time, for a deterministic
Turing machine, in contrast, NP is the corresponding set for a Turing machine.4
The proof of theorem 1 is a proof by contradiction in the extension B′ of
theory B, using the axiomatic method.5 6 B′ is simply consistent7 in the subset
U of deterministic Turing machines that decide whether a propositional formula
is satisfiable or not, corollary 2.8 This justifies the indirect proof method.
∗gmail: stenake.
† 2nd printing. c© Sten-A˚ke Ta¨rnlund, 2009.
‡In the 2nd printing the proof, in the 1st printing, of theorem 1 is divided into three parts
a new lemma 4, a new corollary 8, and the remaining part of the original proof. There is no
appendix in the 2nd printing, but it is available at www.arXiv.0810.5056v1. The 2nd printing
contains some simplifications, more explanations, but no error has been corrected. The main
results were first presented 6 August 2008 in a seminar at the department of Information
Science of Uppsala University Sweden, www. uu. se.
1Following Ta¨rnlund 2008 [23], a simplification of Ta¨rnlund 1977 [22], cf. Turing 1936 [25]
and Kleene 1967 [12].
2 SAT ∈ P ≡ P = NP, Cook 1971 [3] and Levin 1973 [14], cf. Sipser 2005 [20].
3 P vs NP cf. Smale 1998 [21], Cook 2003 [4], and Cook www.claymath.org/millennium.
4cf. Karp 1972 [11], and Sipser 2005 [20].
5Hilbert and Bernays 1934 [10], cf. Kleene 1967 [12].
6The axiomatic method is useful also in computing, e.g. proving that a program is correct,
Clark and Ta¨rnlund 1977 [1], and computability, Ta¨rnlund 2008 [23].
7Simple consistency, cf. Kleene 1967 [12].
8For the set of all Turing machines, however, theory B is simply consistent if and only if
simple consistency of B is not provable in B, Ta¨rnlund 2008 [23].
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The idea of the proof of theorem 1, i.e. SAT 6∈ P , is a relationship between
computing time,9 and proof complexity10 in theory B .
By axiom B, for a Turing machine in U , which decides whether or not ¬F is
satisfiable for a sufficiently large tautology F 39 (on disjunctive normal form),
there is a deduction in theory B that is a propositional formula :
(Q0 ⊃ F ) ∧ (Q1 ⊃ Q0) ∧ · · · ∧ (Qn ⊃ Qn−1) ∧Qn, (1)
where Q0, . . . , Qn are atoms, and n expresses the number of moves of the tape-
head of the Turing machine (computing time).
For several deduction systems including Robinson’s resolution,11 12 (1) yields
a formal deduction of F , i.e.
Qn,¬Qn ∨Qn−1, Qn−1, . . . , Q1,¬Q1 ∨Q0, Q0,¬Q0 ∨ F, F. (2)
Thus, (2) is a proof of F in resolution system R, i.e. ⊢
R
F . Further, the size of
the resolution deduction of F is the number of symbols in (2),10 cf. lemma 4.
Now, assume that
SAT ∈ P . (3)
Then, there is a Turing machine in U that decides whether ¬F is satisfiable or
not in polynomial time in the size of F , i.e. p(F ). Thus for (1) - (2),
n ≤ p(F ) for some i ∈ U any sufficiently large tautology F. (4)
In addition (2) gives,
⊢
R
F and the size of (2) ≤ p(F ). (5)
Now there is a contradiction by (5) and the existence of sufficiently large tau-
tologies not having a resolution proof in polynomial size, e.g. valid pigeonhole
formulas,13 Haken’s theorem,14 and Razborov’s corollary.15
Thus, assumption (3) is false, this explanation has arrived at theorem 1 :
SAT 6∈ P . (6)
Therfore theorem 2 : P 6= NP , follows by the Cook-Levin theorem.2
It remains to present the crucial axiom B, and the first order theory B of
computing in section 2. Notions of complexity are introduced in sections 3 and
4. Essentially, axiom B gives lemma 3, which yields lemma 4. Then, theorem 1
is reached readily in the extension B′ of theory B.
9 The number moves of the tapehead of a Turing machine, with an output, definition 3,
cf. Hartmanis and Stearns 1965 [9], and Sipser 2005 [20].
10 The size of a formal deduction (proof) in propositional logic, cf. definition 18.
11Robinson 1965 [19].
12The resolution system R is used. This deduction system is defined in (47) - (50).
13PHFmn for a propositional pigeonhole formula with n holes and m pigeons, valid or not,
where mn ∈ N . The pigeonhole principle is: there is no injective function with a smaller co-
domain than domain for finite sets. This idea can be expressed as a valid pigeonhole formula
in disjunctive normal form, i.e. PHPmn for |= PHF
m
n some mn ∈ N . Some special cases of
PHPmn : m = n + 1 is classic (it also has the name PFn, cf. Cook and Reckhow 1979 [5]),
m ≥ 2n is weak, m = n2 is very weak, and m→∞ is still weaker.
14Haken’s theorem 1985 [8] for the classic pigeonhole tautology PFn: every resolution proof
of PFn contains at least cn different clauses for c > 1 some c ∈ R any sufficiently large n ∈ N .
15A pigeonhole tautology PHPmn , as a function, has a lower bound exp(Ω(n
1/3)) of the size
of the proof in resolution, for an arbitrary m > n. This is Razborov’s corollary 2003 [18].
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2 A theory of computing
The first order theory B of computing with a single finite axiom B, which char-
acterizes a universal Turing machine, is presented in this section.16 Complexity
concepts are introduced in sections 3 and 4.
Syntactically, there are two predicate symbols of theory B written T (i, a, u),
and U(x, s, z, q, j, i, u). In addition, there is one function symbol . in infix
notation x . y representing a list.
A Turing machine has a finite supply of arbitrary constant symbols, e.g.
the alphabetic symbols, the natural numbers, and the symbols of propositional
logic. For convenience, there is at least a subset of symbols,
{∅, 0, 1, ⊔} ⊆ K, (7)
where K is a finite set of constant symbols, and ⊔ a blank symbol.
There are six sets for the Turing machines in theory B.
A finite set of states,17
Q ⊂ N, (8)
where 0 is the halt state and 1 is the start state.
A finite set S of symbols,18
S for { u : u ∈ K ∨ (u = r . ∅ ∨ u = ∅ . r) ∧ r ∈ K}. (9)
The set D of moves of the tapehead of a Turing machine,
D for {0, 1}, (10)
where 0 is a move to the left and 1 a move to the right.
There is a finite arbitrary large two-way tape, with a left and right tape
having an element between them at the tapehead.19 Initially, the two-way tape
has an empty left tape, the input on the right tape, and the element between
them has the symbol ∅. When a computation starts the tapehead reads the
symbol ∅. The arbitrary long but finite two-way tape is represented as two
lists.20
The list on the right tape grows to the right, if the symbol r . ∅ ∈ S sub-
stitutes ∅. The list on the left tape grows to the left, if the symbol ∅ . r ∈ S
substitutes ∅. Therefore the size of the two-way tape grows one element at a
time controlled by the Turing machine.
There are two sets of lists for the two-way tapes, L for the right tapes, and
L′ for the left tapes. They are as follows.
16The postulates of predicate calculus are employed in theory B. Frequently, G4 of Kleene
1967 [12], a Gentzen-type system 1934-5 [7] is used. The notation can simply be changed to
a Hilbert-type system by Gentzen’s theorem Kleene 1967 [12], and to a resolution system by
Robinson’s theorem 1965 [19]. Similarly, for systems in Quine 1974 § 37 [17].
17 N is the set of the natural numbers.
18 Operators : ⊃, ≡, ∨, ∧, ¬, ∈, =, ≤, ∀, ∃, ⊢, |=, →, are ranked decreasingly to get sim-
pler expressions. Thus, ⊢ B → P ∧ F shall mean (⊢ (B → P )) ∧ F . Moreover, the operators
are used autonymously Kleene 1967 [12].
19Turing 1936 [25] has a one-way tape, for a two-way tape cf. Post 1947 [16].
20Historically, Turing 1936 [25] and Kleene 1967 [12] have a potentially infinite tape. In
contrast, Davis 1958 [6] and Minsky 1967 [15] grow the arbitrary large finite tape in the
computation.
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The right tapes are lists of symbols,21
L(∅) ∧ ∀ (s ∈ S ∧ L(z) ⊃ L(s . z)). (11)
The left tapes are lists of symbols,
L′(∅) ∧ ∀ (s ∈ S ∧ L′(z) ⊃ L′(z . s)). (12)
The set L of the right tapes,
L for {u : L(u) }. (13)
The set L′ of the left tapes,
L′ for {u : L′(u) }. (14)
The set M ⊂ L of codes of Turing machines is a subset of the set of lists.
The code of a Turing machine is a list of quintuples,22
M(∅) ∧ ∀ (p q ∈ Q ∧ r s ∈ S ∧ d ∈ D ∧M(z) ⊃M(p . s . q . r . d . z)). (15)
The set M of codes of Turing machines,
M for {u : M(u) }. (16)
The formulas of B are defined as usual in a first order theory.23
Semantically, the infix function symbol and the predicate symbols denote two
functions24 and two relations25. Of course, there is an intended interpretation
of the function symbol and the predicates in the intended domains of theory B.
T (i, a, u) shall mean Turing machine i with input a computes an output u
and halts for i ∈M a ∈ L u ∈ L′.26 27
U(x, s, z, q, j, i, u) shall mean Turing machine i computes u and halts, where
x . s . z is the two-way tape of i,19 s is a symbol (at the tapehead), x is the
left tape, z is the right tape, i is in state q, and has an auxiliary code j, for
i j ∈M s ∈ S z ∈ L q ∈ Q x u ∈ L′.
For instance, if T (i, A . ∅, ∅ . ∅ . A .B) then U(∅, ∅, A . ∅ . ∅, 1, i, i, ∅ . ∅ . A .B),
i.e. Turing machine i computes the output ∅ . ∅ . A .B. It starts in state 1, reads
the symbol ∅ (by its tapehead), and the two-way tape ∅, ∅, A . ∅ . ∅ is input. Here,
the left tape is the empty list ∅, and the right tape is the list A . ∅ . ∅, where A . ∅
is the input list.28 Thus, the output added one element B to the input list.
The axiom of theory B has the name B.1 29 It is first written down, then an
informal explanation of B follows.30
21 ∀F for a free variable is universally quantified over the entire formula F .
22 cf. Turing 1936 [25].
23cf. Kleene 1967 [12].
24There are two functions with similar syntax. (i) .(r, z) 7→ r . z, where r ∈ S and z ∈ L.
(ii) .(x, r) 7→ x . r, where r ∈ S and x ∈ L′. They are distinguished by their appearance,
function (i) on the right tape and (ii) on the left tape.
25 T ⊆M × L× L′, and U ⊆ L× S × L×Q ×M ×M × L′.
26For example, the formula : A ⊃ B, is written : A . ⊃ . B . ∅, as an input list.
27cf. Kleene p. 243 and footnote 167 Kleene 1967 [12].
28Note that the input list A . ∅ is represented as A . ∅ . ∅ on the right tape of the two-way
tape, i.e. a list on a list. Thus, the beginning and end of the input list are marked with the
symbol ∅. The beginning and end of the two-way tape itself are also marked with ∅.
29The universal Turing machine in axiom B is also a logic program, i.e. for a Turing machine
i ∈ M with input a ∈ L and output u ∈ L′, B computes u, e.g. there is a deduction of u in
Prolog, cf. Kowalski 1974 [13], Colmerauer et al 1973 [2], and Warren 1977 [26].
30The appendix of Ta¨rnlund 2008 [24] shows examples of computations from axiom B.
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Axiom 1 B for
∀ T (i, a, u) ⊃ U(∅, ∅, a . ∅, 1, i, i, u). (17)
∀ U(∅, ∅, a . ∅, 1, i, i, u) ⊃ T (i, a, u). (18)
∀ U(x, s, z, 0, i, i, x). (19)
∀ U(x, v, r . z, p, i, i, u) ⊃ U(x . v, s, z, q, q . s . p . r . 0 . j, i, u). (20)
∀ U(x . r, v, z, p, i, i, u) ⊃ U(x, s, v . z, q, q . s . p . r . 1 . j, i, u). (21)
∀ U(x, s, z, q, j, i, u) ⊃ U(x, s, z, q, q′ . s′ . p . r . d . j, i, u). (22)
Here, ∅, 0 and 1 are constant symbols, and . a function symbol.24
The intended domains are the sets Q in (8), S in (9), D in (10), L in (13),
L′ in (14), and M in (16).
In sentences (17) - (18), there is an equivalence between Turing machine i
with input a and output u, and a universal Turing machine computing output
u with the concrete representations of : the quintuples of i, the two-way tape
holding input a and the symbol ∅, the state 1, and the auxiliary code i.
There is a halt condition in sentence (19), thus for state 0 the left tape x is
the output of the computation that stops.
In sentence (20), if there is a new configuration (the tapehead of Turing
machine i has printed r on the tape, moved to the left, and entered state p)
then in the previous configuration i is in state q reading symbol s and has the
quintuple q . s . p . r . 0 .
Similarly in sentence (21), if there is a new configuration (the tapehead of
Turing machine i has printed r on the tape, moved to the right, and entered
state p) then in the previous configuration i is in state q reading symbol s and
has the quintuple q . s . p . r . 1 .
In sentence (22), Turing machine i is in state q, reads symbol s, and searches
for a quintuple q . s . p . r . d .
Now, if ∃uT (i, a, u) is true then ∃uT (i, a, u) is provable from axiom 1, by
induction on the number of moves of the tapehead in a proof.31 32
Lemma 1 ∃uT (i, a, u) ⊃ ⊢ B → ∃uT (i, a, u) any i ∈M a ∈ L.
The notion of a Turing machine computation as a formal proof in theory B,
is justified by axiom 1, and lemma 1.33 30
Definition 1 A Turing machine computation for a formal proof in theory B.
The set D of deterministic Turing machines is a proper subset of the set of
all Turing machines, and is introduced next.
Definition 2 D for {i : i has no quintuples q . s . p . r . d and q . s . p′ . r′ . d′ and
¬(p = p′ ∧ r = r′ ∧ d = d′) and i ∈M}.
31The quantifiers some and any in the proof (meta) theory of B are applied to the entire
sentence in front of them.
32There is a proof of lemma 1 in Ta¨rnlund 2008 [23].
33For a formal proof in predicate calculus, cf. Kleene 1967 [12].
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3 Computing time
In this section some complexity notions are introduced.
For a Turing machine, with an output, the computing time is the number of
moves of its tapehead in the computation.9 A Turing machine computation is
a formal proof in theory B, thus the computing time is the number of moves of
the tapehead in a proof in B.16 33 34 35
Definition 3 H(⊢ B → ∃uT (i, a, u), n) for n is the number of moves of the
tapehead of Turing machine i in a proof of the sequent B → ∃uT (i, a, u) in G4
any i ∈M a ∈ L n ∈ N .
The function || computes the size of an (input) list.36
Definition 4 |a| for the number of symbols of a ∈ L.
A polynomial in the size of (the input) a is written p(a).
Definition 5 p(a) for c · |a|q some c q ∈ N any a ∈ L.
The notion of a polynomial upper bound of the computing time is introduced.
Definition 6 ⊢ B → ∃uT (i, a, u) in p(a) for H(⊢ B → ∃uT (i, a, u), n) ∧ n ≤
p(a) any i ∈M a ∈ L some n ∈ N .
Definition 7 F for the set of formulas of propositional logic.
The set SAT of satisfiable propositional formulas, and the set TAUT of
tautologies are introduced.
Definition 8 SAT for {F : F ∈ F ∧ 6|= ¬F}.
Definition 9 TAUT for {F : F ∈ F ∧ |= F }.
A name s is introduced for a Turing machine that computes whether a propo-
sitional formula26 is satisfiable, with output ∅ . 0, or not with output ∅ . 1.37
Definition 10 T (s, a, u) for a = F . ∅ ∧ ((u = ∅ . 0 ∧ 6|= ¬F ) ∨ (u =
∅ . 1 ∧ |= ¬F )) s ∈M any a ∈ L F ∈ F u ∈ L.
The set of correct deterministic Turing machines that decide whether a
propositional formula is satisfiable or not, is specified by Turing machine s,
by definitions 2 and 10.
Definition 11 U for { i : ∃u (T (i, a, u) ∧ T (s, a, u)) ∧ i ∈ D ∧ any a ∈ L }.
T (i,¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) if and only if F is a tautology for any i in U and F in F .
Corollary 1 T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) ≡ |=→ F any i ∈ U F ∈ F .
34A move of the tapehead of a Turing machine is specified in (20) - (21) of axiom 1.
35Clearly, there is a relation that counts the number of moves of the tapehead of a Turing
machine in a proof in theory B, i.e. H ⊆ E×N , where E is the set of proofs in theory B and
N is the set of natural numbers.
36 || : L→ N .
37Of course, Turing machine s could compute the output satisfiable for ∅ . 0, and unsatisfi-
able for ∅ . 1. For reasons of space, the shorter version is used.
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Theory B is simply consistent in U , i.e. there is no contradiction, by axiom
1, lemma 1, and definitions 10 - 11.7 8
Corollary 2 ⊢ B → (∃u T (i, a, u) ∧ ¬∃u T (i, a, u)) no i ∈ U a ∈ L.
In particular, ∃u T (i, a, u) is true if and only if ∃u T (i, a, u) is provable from
axiom B for i ∈ U a ∈ L, by axiom 1, corollary 2, lemma 1, and definition 11.
Corollary 3 ∃u T (i, a, u) ≡ ⊢ B → ∃u T (i, a, u) any i ∈ U a ∈ L.
The formula SAT ∈ P is introduced in the simply consistent extension
B′ of theory B, corollary 2. Writing SAT ∈ P for there is some deterministic
Turing machine in U that decides, in polynomial time, whether any propositional
formula is satisfiable or not, cf. footnotes 2 - 4.
Definition 12 SAT ∈ P for ⊢ B → ∃u T (i, F . ∅, u) in p(F ) some i ∈ U any
F ∈ F .
T (i,¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) is provable from axiom B if and only if F is a tautology for
any i in U and F in F , by corollaries 1 and 3.
Corollary 4 ⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) ≡ |=→ F any i ∈ U F ∈ F .
If SAT ∈ P then T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) is provable from axiom B, in polyno-
mial time, for some deterministic Turing machine i in U any tautology F , by
definitions 9 and 12, and corollary 4.
Corollary 5 SAT ∈ P ⊃ ⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) in p(F ) some i ∈ U any
F ∈ TAUT.
4 Computing time and proof complexity
There is a relationship between computing time 9 i.e., the number of moves of
the tapehead of a Turing machine in a computation, and proof complexity,10
i.e. the size of a proof in propositional logic. The principal lemma 3 gives this
relationship in lemma 4, i.e. if a deterministic Turing machine in U decides
whether or not any sufficiently large negated tautology is satisfiable in polyno-
mial time then there is a proof of the tautology in polynomial size in resolution.
An example begins an explanation of this relationship.
Example 1 If a Turing machine in U decides whether or not any sufficiently
large negated tautology F is satisfiable then the sequent B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1)
is provable for any i in U F in TAUT, in Kleene’s G4. Such a proof can be
constructed, first, by successive applications of the rule ∀ → in G4 getting the
propositional conjunctions (31) to (23) from axiom B. Second, using successive
applications of the rule ⊃→ in G4. A Turing machine in U is deterministic,
thus the conjunctions (23) - (31) are unique.
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Writing A(i, F, n) for
U(∅ . 1, s
n
, z
n
, 0, i, i, ∅ . 1)∧ (23)
(
U(∅ . 1, s
n
, z
n
, 0, i, i, ∅ . 1) ⊃ U(x
n−1
, s
n−1
, z
n−1
, q
n−1
, j
n−1
, i, ∅ . 1)
)
∧ · · · ∧ (24)
(
U(x
m+3
, s
m+3
, z
m+3
, q
m+3
, i, i, ∅ . 1) ⊃ U(x
m+2
, s
m+2
, z
m+2
, q
m+2
, j
m+2
, i, ∅ . 1)
)
∧ (25)
(
U(x
m+2
, s
m+2
, z
m+2
, q
m+2
, j
m+2
, i, ∅ . 1) ⊃ U(x
m+2
, s
m+2
, z
m+2
, q
m+2
, i, i, ∅ . 1)
)
∧ · · · ∧ (26)
(
U(x
2
, s
2
, z
2
, q
2
, i, i, ∅ . 1) ⊃ U(x
1
, s
1
, z
1
, q
1
, j
1
, i, ∅ . 1)
)
∧ (27)
(
U(x
1
, s
1
, z
1
, q
1
, j
1
, i, ∅ . 1) ⊃ U(x
1
, s
1
, z
1
, q
1
, i, i, ∅ . 1)
)
∧ · · · ∧ (28)
(
U(x
1
, s
1
, z
1
, q
1
, i, i, ∅ . 1) ⊃ U(∅, ∅, ¬F . ∅ . ∅, 1, j
0
, i, ∅ . 1)
)
∧ (29)
(
U(∅, ∅, ¬F . ∅ . ∅, 1, j
0
, i, ∅ . 1) ⊃ U(∅, ∅, ¬F . ∅ . ∅, 1, i, i, ∅ . 1)
)
∧ · · · ∧ (30)
(
U(∅, ∅, ¬F . ∅ . ∅, 1, i, i, ∅ . 1)⊃ T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1)
)
any i ∈ U F ∈ TAUT (31)
n ∈ N some m ∈ N j
m
j
m+2
j
n−1
∈ D x
m
x
m+2
x
m+3
x
n−1
∈ L′
z
m
z
m+2
z
m+3
z
n−1
∈ L s
m
s
m+2
s
m+3
∈ S q
m
q
m+2
q
m+3
∈ Q.
Then,
⊢ B → T (i,¬F .∅, ∅ . 1) ⊃ A(i, F, n) any i ∈ U F ∈ TAUT some n ∈ N.
(32)
Not all of A(i, F, n) in (32) is necessary, however, to count the number of
moves of the tapehead of a Turing machine in the computation. Informally,
writing V (i, F, n) for (23) - (26), and (31). This relation is a simplification of
A(i, F, n), but still counts the number of moves of the tapehead of a determin-
istic Turing machine in the computation.
In example 1, the relation V (i, F, n) counts the number of moves of the
tapehead in a computation. It is introduced more precisely as follows.
Definition 13 V (i, F, n) for
(
U(x
0
, s
0
, z
0
, q
0
, i, i, ∅ . 1) ⊃ T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1)
)
∧ (33)
U(∅ . 1, s
n
, z
n
, 0, i, i, ∅ . 1) ∧ (34)
∧
1≤m≤n
(
U(x
m
, s
m
, z
m
, q
m
, i, i, ∅ . 1) ⊃ U(x
m−1
, s
m−1
, z
m−1
, q
m−1
, j
m−1
, i, ∅ . 1)
)
∧ (35)
(
U(x
m−1
, s
m−1
, z
m−1
, q
m−1
, j
m−1
, i, ∅ . 1) ⊃ U(x
m−1
, s
m−1
, z
m−1
, q
m−1
, i, i, ∅ . 1)
)
any i ∈ U F ∈ TAUT n ∈ N some m ∈ N x
m
x
m−1
∈ L′ z
n
z
m
z
m−1
∈ L
s
n
s
m
s
m−1
∈ S q
m
q
m−1
∈ Q j
m−1
∈ D.
If a Turing machine in U decides whether or not ¬F is satisfiable in com-
puting time n then V (i, F, n) any F ∈ TAUT n ∈ N .
Lemma 2 H(⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1), n) ⊃ V (i, F, n) any i ∈ U n ∈ N
F ∈ TAUT.
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Proof.38
⋆ H(⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1), n) i ∈ U F ∈ TAUT n ∈ N (36)
⋆ ⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1), definition 3 (37)
⋆ V (i, F, n), axiom 1, corollary 2, and definition 13 (38)
H(⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1), n) ⊃ V (i, F, n) any i ∈ U F ∈ TAUT n ∈ N (39)
Atoms (”propositional variables”) are usually introduced as names for large
propositional formulas that are not only inconvenient, but also complex. For
sufficiently large input, these atoms give simpler propositional formulas in a
standard syntax of propositional logic.
Definition 14 Qm for U(xm, sm, zm, qm, i, i, ∅ . 1) any i ∈ U xm ∈ L′ zm ∈
L sm ∈ S qm ∈ Q m ∈ N some atom Qm ∈ F .
Definition 15 Rm+1 for U(xm, sm, zm, qm, jm, i, ∅ . 1) any i ∈ U jm ∈ D
xm ∈ L′ zm ∈ L sm ∈ S qm ∈ Q m ∈ N some atom Rm+1 ∈ F .
Writing W (i, F, n) for an equivalent formula of V (i, F, n) any i ∈ U F ∈
TAUT n ∈ N , by the auxiliary atoms in definitions 14 - 15.
Definition 16 W (i, F, n) for Qn ∧
∧
1≤m≤n
(Rm ⊃ Qm−1) ∧ (Qm ⊃ Rm) ∧
(Q0 ⊃ T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1)) any i ∈ U F ∈ TAUT n ∈ N some m ∈ N some
atoms Q0, . . . , Qn, R1, . . . , Rn ∈ F .
If V (i, F, n) thenW (i, F, n) for any i ∈ U F ∈ TAUT n ∈ N , by definitions
13 - 16.
Corollary 6 V (i, F, n) ⊃W (i, F, n) any i ∈ U F ∈ TAUT n ∈ N .
Writing Y (i, F, n) for a simplified W (i, F, n).
Definition 17 Y (i, F, n) for (Q0 ⊃ F ) ∧ Qn ∧
∧
1≤m≤n
(Qm ⊃ Qm−1) any
i ∈ U F ∈ TAUT n ∈ N some m ∈ N some atoms Q0, . . . , Qn ∈ F .
If W (i, F, n) then Y (i, F, n) for any i ∈ U F ∈ TAUT n ∈ N , by corollary
1 and definitions 16 - 17.
Corollary 7 W (i, F, n) ⊃ Y (i, F, n) any i ∈ U F ∈ TAUT n ∈ N .
If a Turing machine in U decides whether or not ¬F is unsatisfiable in
polynomial time then Y (i, F, n), where n ≤ p(F ), any sufficiently large F in
TAUT some n in N .39 40
Lemma 3 ⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) in p(F ) ⊃ Y (i, F, n) ∧ n ≤ p(F ) any
i ∈ U any sufficiently large F ∈ TAUT some n ∈ N .
38Introduction of a star shall mean introduction of an assumption, and elimination of a star
shall mean that an assumption is discharged, cf. Quine 1974 § 37 [17].
39A sentence C is true for sufficiently large natural numbers if there exists a n′ ∈ N such
that the sentence C(n) is true for all n ≥ n′ n ∈ N .
40 lim
|F |→∞
F∈TAUT
|U(xm, sm, zm, qm, i, i, ∅ . 1)|
|F |
= 1 and lim
|F |→∞
F∈TAUT
|U(xm, sm, zm, qm, j, i, ∅ . 1)|
|F |
= 1 for
xm ∈ L′ sm ∈ S zm ∈ L qm ∈ Q i ∈ U j ∈ D m ∈ N , cf. definition 13.
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Proof.
⋆ ⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) in p(F ) i ∈ U sufficiently large F ∈ TAUT (40)
⋆ H(⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1), n) ∧ n ≤ p(F ) (41)
⋆ Y (i, F, n) some n ∈ N, lemma 2 corollaries 6− 7 and footnote 40 (42)
⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) in p(F ) ⊃ Y (i, F, n) ∧ n ≤ p(F ) (43)
any i ∈ U any sufficiently large F ∈ TAUT some n ∈ N
4.1 Proof complexity
Before the notion of the size of a deduction (proof) is taken up, the idea of a
formal deduction in propositional logic is introduced.
The inference rule of the Hilbert system H is modus ponens:
A, A ⊃ B
B
(44)
where A and B are any propositional formulas.
In the Hilbert system H , a formal deduction is a finite list:
F1, . . . , Fn (45)
of formulas, where Fk is either an assumption formula A1, . . . , Am, an axiom or
follows from Fi and Fj by (44) for 1 ≤ i j < k ≤ n. The formal deduction (45)
is a deduction in Hilbert system H of its last formula Fn.
41
In the Hilbert system H , the existence of a formal deduction is written,
Γ ⊢
H
Fn for some formal deduction F1, . . . , Fn by (44) (46)
where Γ is a list of (zero or more) assumption formulas A1, . . . , Am. If there is
no assumption, m < 1, then there is a formal proof of Fn, i.e. ⊢H Fn.
Hilbert systems are consistent and complete.42
Similarly, for Robinson’s resolution systems,11 which have a single inference
rule. For the resolution system R the inference rule is:
A ∨ P ∨B, C ∨ ¬P ∨D
A ∨B ∨ C ∨D
(47)
where A B C and D are any propositional formulas on disjunctive normal form,
DNF, (including the blank formula ⊔), and P is any propositional atom.
A formal deduction in resolution is like a formal deduction in a Hilbert
system, except there is no logical axiom. In resolution system R, a formal
deduction is a finite list:
F1, . . . , Fn (48)
of formulas, where Fk is either an assumption formula A1, . . . , Am, or follows
from Fi and Fj by (47) for 1 ≤ i j < k ≤ n. The list (48) is a deduction in
resolution system R of its last formula Fn.
Hence, the existence of a formal deduction in resolution system R is written,
Γ ⊢
R
Fn for there is a formal deduction F1, . . . , Fn by (47), (49)
41Following Kleene 1967 [12].
42cf. Kleene 1967 [12].
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where Γ is a list of (zero or more) assumption formulas A1, . . . , Am, if m < 1
then ⊢
R
Fn.
There is a proof rule for indirect deductions (proofs).
If Γ, F ′ ⊢
R
⊔ then Γ ⊢
R
F, (50)
where F is a formula on disjunctive normal form, and F ′ ≡ ¬F , where F ′ is on
conjunctive normal form (CNF), and ⊔ is the blank formula.
If Γ is the empty list then there is a proof, i.e. if F ′ ⊢
R
⊔ then ⊢
R
F .
Resolution systems are consistent and complete.43
The size of a formal deduction F1, . . . , Fn is the number of symbols in the
formal deduction. Clearly, there is a relation,44 which computes the size of a
formal deduction in a Hilbert system, and a Robinson resolution system.45
Definition 18 G(Γ ⊢
t
Fn, u) for u =
∑
1≤ k≤n
|Fk| any u ∈ N some formal
deduction F1, . . . , Fn in t with assumption Γ, where t ∈ {H,R}.
A polynomial upper bound of the size of a deduction is introduced.
Definition 19 Γ ⊢
t
F in p(F ) for G(Γ ⊢
t
F, u) ∧ u ≤ p(F ) any F ∈ F some
u ∈ N , where t ∈ {H,R}.
Then by lemma 3 and the notion of a formal deduction in resolution system
R the following result follows.
If a Turing machine in U decides whether or not ¬F is satisfiable in polyno-
mial time then there is a polynomial deduction of F in resolution system R for
any sufficiently large tautology F on disjunctive normal form.
Lemma 4 ⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) in p(F ) ⊃ ⊢
R
F in p(F ) any i ∈ U any
sufficiently large F ∈ TAUT on disjunctive normal form.
Proof.
⋆ ⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) in p(F ) i ∈ U a sufficiently (51)
large F ∈ TAUT on DNF
⋆ (Q0 ⊃ F ) ∧ Qn ∧
∧
1≤ k≤n
n≤p(F )
(Qk ⊃ Qk−1) some atoms (52)
Q0, . . . , Qn ∈ F some n ∈ N, lemma 3 and definition 17
⋆ Qn,¬Qn ∨Qn−1, Qn−1, . . . , Q0,¬Q0 ∨ F, F, a deduction (53)
in resolution system R of F by (47) from (52)
⋆ ⊢
R
F in p(F ), definitions 18− 19, (49) and (53) (54)
⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) in p(F ) ⊃ ⊢
R
F in p(F ) any i ∈ U any (55)
sufficiently large F ∈ TAUT on DNF
There are sufficiently large tautologies on disjunctive normal form not hav-
ing a proof in polynomial time in resolution system R, e.g. valid pigeonhole
formulas,13 cf. Haken 1985 [8], and Razborov 2003 [18].14 15
43 If Γ ⊢
R
F then Γ |= F (consistency). If Γ |= F then Γ ⊢
R
F , where formulas in Γ are on
CNF, and F on DNF (completeness), cf. Robinson’s theorem 1965 [19].
44G ⊆ K × N . K is the set of first order formal deductions, and N the set of the natural
numbers.
45 |F | for the number of symbols of F ∈ F , cf. footnote 36 and definition 4.
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Corollary 8 ¬(⊢
R
F in p(F ) any sufficiently large F ∈ TAUT on disjunctive
normal form).
SAT is not in P in the simply consistent extension B′ of theory B,43 39 by
a proof by contradiction.
Theorem 1 SAT 6∈ P is true in the simply consistent extension B′ of theory
B.
Proof.
⋆ SAT ∈ P in the simply consistent extension B′ of B, definition 12 (56)
⋆ ⊢ B → T (i, ¬F . ∅, ∅ . 1) in p(F ) some i ∈ U any (57)
sufficiently large F ∈ TAUT on DNF, corollary 5
⋆ ⊢
R
F in p(F ) any sufficiently large F ∈ TAUT on DNF, lemma 4 (58)
SAT 6∈ P in B′, contradiction (58) and corollary 8, corollary 2 (59)
In the extension B′′ of theory B′ the formula P = NP is defined by the
Cook-Levin theorem.2 Then, by theorem 1.
Theorem 2 P 6= NP is true in the simply consistent extension B′′ of theory
B.
By lemma 1, definitions 11 - 12, and theorem 1.
Corollary 9 SAT 6∈ P is true, and provable in the simply consistent extension
B′ of theory B.
By lemma 1, theorem 2, and corollary 9.
Corollary 10 P 6= NP is true, and provable in the simply consistent extension
B′′ of theory B.
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